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The UNLV Conference provided the opportunity for child welfare advo-
cates across the country to meet and discuss issues surrounding the representa-
tion of children in the child welfare system. Many thoughtful
recommendations were made about raising the quality of representation that
children are receiving. The Office of the Cook County Public Guardian
strongly agrees that children should have an attorney in abuse, neglect, delin-
quency and other proceedings, however, we do not agree with the recommen-
dation that the role of counsel be limited to a client-directed model. While the
Recommendations recognize that younger children may not have the capacity to
direct the course of the representation, the conference's finding that children
older than seven would usually have the capacity to direct the litigation is not
supported by the experience and knowledge that the Office of the Public
Guardian has gained over the last twenty years.1 In our experience, the func-
tions of the guardian ad litem are a crucial component of representing children,
in order to ensure that the best interests of the child are advanced. Moreover,
an absolute age rule does not recognize the uniqueness of every child and the
uniqueness of each child's situation.
Representing children in child protection cases is as rewarding as it is
difficult. The attorney-client relationship may last for years as the children's
cases wind through the court system. Over the years, the children and the
issues affecting their lives change. Because children's capacity changes with
their age, their life experiences, their education, and the nature of the decisions
that they are being asked to consider, the role of their attorney must also
change. Every case is not only unique, but also constantly changing with the
child, and lawyers must be able to adapt and serve accordingly. The attorney/
* The author is the Cook County Public Guardian. The team of Public Guardian staff
members who prepared this article also include: Jean Agathen, J.D., Ph.D.; Carol Casey,
J.D.; Brian Finley, J.D.; Jessica Haspel, J.D.; Mark Ruehl, Ph.D.; Jennifer Saperstein, J.D.;
Janeen Barth Schlotzer, J.D.; and Nicholas Youngblood, M.A., M.P.A., J.D. Margaret
Carlson, a Loyola University Chicago law student, also assisted with research.
I The Office of the Public Guardian represents more than 10,000 children as both attorney
and guardian ad litem. Its multidisciplinary juvenile division staff includes more than 120
attorneys, as well as numerous social workers, paralegals, investigators, former educators, a
nurse, and a clinical psychologist. The office is also a training site for child psychiatry
interns. The office also has a domestic relations division, a disabled adults division, an
appeals unit, and an impact litigation unit.
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guardian ad litem model allows the attorney the needed discretion to serve the
individual needs of the child client. This article is a brief review of child devel-
opmental and legal bases for the model as well as a description of the model.
I. CHILDREN'S COGNITIVE COMPETENCE
The development of cognitive competence in children and adolescents
proceeds in a complex manner. It would be a mistake to assume that all chil-
dren at a given age or ability level perceive, reason, and perform in the same
way in a particular decision-making situation. Current information-processing
theories of cognitive development suggest that competencies emerge in specific
situations at different times as a result of the different processing demands of
various tasks, and individual differences in experiences. 2
However, age is an important factor. Research has consistently shown
that compared to preschoolers, school-aged children increasingly think in a
more organized and logical fashion about concrete information. But school-
aged children generally cannot sort out evidence pertaining to more than two
variables at once, and they have great difficulty reasoning from circumstances
that contradict reality or their own beliefs.3 Adolescents can generally think
more abstractly and competently than middle-school-aged children on cognitive
tasks. However, they often feel overwhelmed by choices, and consequently
may resort to impulsive actions, immature responses, or indecision.4 There-
fore, although a child may be able to verbalize a preference, the child may not
have the capacity to direct the course of representation.
Given children's immaturity in cognitive functioning and the many influ-
ences that drive their decision-making, an attorney representing children must
have the discretion to use a best interest analysis in their representation.
Although the tendency is to "force the fit" of representing children to represent-
ing adults, there is a necessity, based upon the uniqueness of each child and the
cognitive limitations of children generally, to represent children differently.
II. CHILDREN'S CAPACITY ADDRESSED IN OTHER LEGAL AREAS
Limitations in children's ability to understand information that is highly
significant for their lives, and the limitations even in adolescents to make com-
petent decisions in important areas, are reflected in the law. There are several
areas of the law where scholars agree that juveniles lack the same capacity as
adults, and should therefore be treated as a distinct group. Criminal law is one
of those areas.
In the past, a criminal defendant's competence to stand trial did not come
into question unless there was reason to believe that the defendant was mentally
ill or mentally retarded. In the last decade, however, scholars began to suggest
2 See generally DAVID F. BJORKLUND, CHILDREN'S THINKING (2004); LAURA E. BERK,
CHILD DEVELOPMENT (2006).
' See BERK, supra note 3.
4 Id.
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that "developmental immaturity also may render juveniles incompetent."5
Advocates began to write about this in the area of criminal law in reaction to a
trend across the nation in which more and more juveniles were being prose-
cuted in adult criminal courts. This trend was a result of a significant increase
in the number of violent crimes committed by juveniles in the late 1980s and
early 1990s.6
There is widespread agreement with the view that juvenile offenders are
less culpable than adult offenders, even for a comparable crime. C. Antoinette
Clarke asserts that adolescents make judgments about involvement in crimes
less maturely than adults do, and thus adolescents warrant differential treatment
if found accountable.7 Barry C. Feld argues that younger offenders are not as
blameworthy as adults because they have not yet fully internalized moral
norms, or learned to control their actions.8 Juvenile justice advocates also
argue that because of their diminished culpability, young offenders should not
be eligible for the death penalty. Feld observes that because of their inexperi-
ence and immature judgment, juveniles are treated differently from adults in
numerous legal areas, including their ability to serve on juries, vote, marry,
drive, and drink. He reasons that "[it would be inconsistent and cruelly ironic
to find juveniles' culpability and criminal capacity equivalent to that of adults
for purposes of capital punishment."9
The United States Supreme Court agreed with the view that juvenile
offenders should not be eligible for the death penalty in its decision in Roper v.
Simmons,1 ° which was delivered by Justice Kennedy. The Court compared
adolescents to mentally retarded adults and concluded that juveniles' immatur-
ity and irresponsibility prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on them.
Justice Kennedy wrote that the differences between adults and juveniles
"render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders
.... From a moral standpoint, it would be misguided to equate the failings of a
minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's
character deficiencies will be reformed."" The Supreme Court has therefore
given credence to juvenile justice advocates' contention that age renders youth-
ful offenders less culpable in the area of criminal law.
Other areas of the law where juveniles are treated as a separate group are
divorce proceedings and other custody cases. For example, children may or
may not have a preference concerning which of their divorcing parents should
be custodial. But there are several views on the wisdom of even asking chil-
dren to express a preference. 2 Courts have noted the pressures involved in
asking children to make decisions about which parent should have custody.
' Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of Atkins for Exe-
cuting and Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 463, 524 (2003).
6 See id. at 522.
1 C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and Punitive
Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 KAN. L. REV. 659, 696 (2005).
8 Feld, supra note 5, at 502.
9 Id. at 480.
'o 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
11 Id. at 570.
12 Cynthia Starnes, Swords in the Hands of Babes: Rethinking Custody Interviews After
Troxel, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 115, 119-43.
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The Illinois Appellate Court, in In re Marriage of Hefer, stated that "[t]he more
sensitive courts do not specifically ask a child whether he prefers to live with
his father or his mother."13 The court in Hefer reversed the trial court's award
of custody of two children to the father, even though both children, then thir-
teen and nine years old, had expressed, in camera, a preference for living with
their father. The court found their expressed preference to be more hopeful
than reality-based, as they had spent very little time with their father in the
years before he was awarded custody.
The American Bar Association Section of Family Law, in its Standards of
Practice for Lawyers Representing Children in Custody Cases (2003), has indi-
cated that all attorneys for children in custody cases should "elicit and assess
the child's views."' 4 However, in doing so, the lawyer may need to work with
other professionals in order to assess the child's developmental abilities and to
interpret the child's responses. 5 The lawyer must also exercise caution
because the child's views may change over time and may be the result of intim-
idation and manipulation.' 6
On the other hand, some authors counsel against interviewing pre-adoles-
cent children at all about their preferences regarding placement or visitation, on
the grounds that the children will feel responsible for whatever arrangement is
established after the interview, and that children of this age are vulnerable to
parental coaching. 7 They believe it may be wise not to pose such questions to
children who cannot understand that their wishes will be only one of the pieces
of information considered by the court.1 8 Similarly, Goldstein et al. believe
that children by definition need adult caregivers who determine what is best for
them.19 They also believe that counsel appointed by the court may seek infor-
mation from child clients and their parents, but should not seek instructions
from them, because the attorney's guidance should come from relevant statutes
and the court.
While the Office of the Public Guardian does not agree with the view that
children should never be asked to express a preference or be allowed to provide
instructions, it is certainly true that great caution should be exercised in this
area, even when interviewing older children. Skilled interviewing of children
will elicit important information to be used in advocating for them, beyond
information about their preferences. Information such as activities and routines
involving the parents, the identity of adults the children would seek help from,
and the child's hopes for the future, are important when acting as a child's
advocate.
Assuming that asking children to express a preference for the custodial
parent is the correct approach, there is evidence that a child's age alone should
13 In re Marriage of Hefer, 667 N.E. 2d 1094, 1097 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
14 ABA SECTION OF FAMILY LAW, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS REPRESENTING
CHILDREN IN CUSTODY CASES pt. III.E (2003).
15 Id. at cmt.
16 Id.
17 See, e.g., G. ANDREW H. BENJAMIN & JACKIE K. GOLLAN, FAMILY EVALUATION IN CUS-
TODY LITIGATION 86 (2003).
18 Id. at 87.
19 JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMEN-
TAL ALTERNATIVE 144 (1996).
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not determine the weight given to that preference. Even adolescents may be
significantly more suggestible than adults, and, like younger children, they may
experience divided loyalties that make it difficult for them to express a clear
preference.20 Although it may be expedient to draw a bright line based on age,
even commentators who advance the bright line idea differ on where the age
line should be drawn: one says age six, another age twelve, yet another age
ten.21 This disagreement about the "old-enough" age suggests that any age
may be arbitrary, that "developmental psychology does not offer what lawyers
would most like: definitive, fixed information upon which to ground simple,
age-based rules."22
HI. CHILDREN SHOULD HAVE A DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT ALL
STAGES OF A CHILD PROTECTION PROCEEDING
At the heart of every stage in a child protection proceeding is the child.
Throughout the process, judges render decisions pertaining to the placement of
the child, visitation with parents and siblings, and the long-term goal for the
child. For example, a judge in a particular proceeding may order a child placed
in a restrictive residential treatment facility to meet the child's severe mental
health issues, or decide not-to-not remove a child from an allegedly abusive
foster home. Each of these pivotal decisions implicates the child's liberty inter-
ests.23 As such, fundamental fairness dictates that children must be represented
by an attorney at all stages and at all ages to protect their due process rights.
While many states have enacted legislation mandating that an attorney be
appointed for all children subject to a child protection proceeding,24 other states
have merely mandated the appointment of a non-lawyer advocate. While a
non-lawyer advocate can provide the court with valuable information about the
child, a non-lawyer cannot sufficiently represent the child's interests or desires
20 Starnes, supra note 12, at 132.
21 Id. at 132-34.
22 Id. at 134 (quoting Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Empower-
ment of Child Clients, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 895, 919 (1999)).
23 See Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
[C]hildren have fundamental liberty interests at stake in deprivation and TPR proceedings.
These include a child's interest in his or her own safety, health and well-being, as well as an
interest in maintaining the integrity of the family unit and in having a relationship with his or her
biological parents .... Furthermore, a child's liberty interests continue to be at stake even after
the child is placed in state custody. At that point, a 'special relationship' is created that gives rise
to rights to reasonably safe living conditions and services necessary to ensure protection from
physical, psychological, and emotional harm.
Id.; Marvin Ventrell, The Practice of Law for Children, 66 MONT. L. REv. 1, 2 (2005) ("For
many of these children, the legal proceedings in which they are involved determine the
course of their lives and may be a matter of life and death."); Jacob Ethan Smiles, A Child's
Due Process Right to Legal Counsel in Abuse and Neglect Dependency Proceedings, 37
F m. L.Q. 485, 493-94 (2003) ("Dependency proceedings implicate a child's liberty interest
because at stake for the child is his safety, his familial relationships, his 'emotional and
social interests,' and his interest in a 'stable and permanent home.'") (citation omitted).
24 The following is an illustrative, non-exhaustive list of state statutes that provide an attor-
ney for all children involved in child protection proceedings: ALA. CODE § 12-15-1 (1975);
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 317 (Deering 2006); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-5(1) (West
2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-600 (2004); N.Y. F m. CT. Acr § 242 (McKinney 2004).
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in such proceedings. Children must be appointed their own attorneys with
full party rights to navigate the court system, file motions, present independent
evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. Only a lawyer entrusted to represent a
child can ensure that the child's interests are properly represented. All other
parties, from the attorneys representing the state to the parents' attorneys, have
interests and motivations other than what is in the child's best interests.2 6
In early 2005, a federal district court in Georgia squarely addressed the
issue of whether foster children have a due process right to counsel in child
protection proceedings. The court in Kenny A. held that a child's right to coun-
sel in a child protection proceeding is guaranteed under the Due Process Clause
of Georgia's State Constitution. 27 The court utilized the three-part federal test
enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge.28 Nothing in the court's analysis was
unique to any provisions of the Georgia State Constitution as distinguished
from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hopefully,
the court's decision in Kenny A. portends a nationwide recognition of a child's
constitutional due process right to counsel in child protection proceedings.
IV. THE ROLE OF BEST INTEREST AND THE DESCRIPTION OF AN ATrTORNEY/
GUARDIAN Ad Litem Model
In Chicago and the surrounding Cook County suburbs, thousands of chil-
dren in child protection proceedings are zealously, effectively and ethically rep-
resented by attorneys/guardians ad litem in the Office of the Public Guardian.
Our appointment as attorney and guardian ad litem allows us to advance our
clients' best interests as well as act as their lawyers. While this dual capacity
presents challenges, it allows for the most effective and efficient representation
of children in child protection proceedings. The two roles inform each other,
and only rarely present unmanageable conflicts, as discussed below.
One of our cases that demonstrates the complexity of the situations facing
an attorney/guardian ad litem involves an eleven-year-old named "Carmela."
Carmela presented in the emergency room three times in two months with a
severe diabetic crisis. After she nearly died, the doctors opined that her diabe-
25 See Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1361 (holding that "only the appointment of counsel can
effectively mitigate the risk of significant errors in deprivation and TPR proceedings");
Bridget Kearns, Comment, A Warm Heart But a Cool Head: Why a Dual Guardian Ad
Litem System Best Protects Families Involved in Abused and Neglected Proceedings, 2002
Wis. L. REV. 699, 726; Shari Shink, Justice for Our Children: Justice for a Change, 82
DENV. U. L. REV. 629, 644 (2005) ("Absent the assistance of legal representation, a child has
no realistic prospect of successfully navigating the complexities of the court system.").
26 See Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1358-59; Smiles, supra note 23, at 492-93; Donald N.
Duquette, Legal Representation for Children in Protection Proceedings: Two Distinct Law-
yer Roles Are Required, 34 FAm. L.Q. 441, 446 (2000).
In the past courts have relied on other participants in the child protection process, such as the
judge or child welfare agency, to look out for the child's interests. Despite good intentions,
however, these other participants have divided loyalties and interests and may not be committed
to ferreting out and promoting the interests of the child alone .... Since these are legal court
proceedings, the child's advocate ought to be a lawyer.
Id.
27 Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1353.
28 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
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tes was being poorly managed at home. Carmela is an honor student in regular
education classes. Her mother and grandmother appear to have significant cog-
nitive deficits, but assisted Carmela with daily insulin shots and twice-daily
monitoring of her blood sugar. Carmela is very attached to her mother and
wants to be immediately returned home, but the physicians involved with her
care fear that she will die without adequate management of her diabetes. It is
likely that the mother will continue to have considerable difficulty understand-
ing how to manage her diabetes, and it is suspected that Carmela easily
manipulates her mother to obtain excessive amounts of sugar. Carmela not
only worries about managing her diabetes, she also worries about her intellectu-
ally limited mother. Within a few days, she will likely be ready for discharge
from the hospital. The state has filed a petition for temporary custody. The
court has appointed the Office of the Public Guardian to represent Carmela.
While advocating for intensive home-based services in order to send
Carmela home may seem like the easy answer, adequate home-based services
to maintain her in the home are not currently available. The risks for diabetic
coma and death are considerable. An attorney in a strictly client-directed law-
yer role may have to argue for return home to a situation that has a high
probability of failing and causing the client's death. Carmela's attorney/guard-
ian ad litem is able to advocate for the provision of extensive services prior to
her return home that will ensure her safety as well as a successful reunification.
Unlike the client-directed model of representation, the attorney/guardian ad
litem model does not treat client capacity as "an either/or proposition." 9 The
better practice is to take on the more difficult task of assessing and considering
capacity as a continuum,3" which requires an in-depth understanding of the
child clients in order to effectively advocate the position that is in their best
interest while presenting their preferences.
The need for a child advocate who will represent the best interest of the
child is well recognized, and input from that child advocate is necessary for the
court to make an informed determination in a child protection proceeding.
Without the ability of a guardian ad litem to present best interest evidence to
the judge, it may not be presented. Moreover, the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act of 1974 ("CAPTA") requires the appointment of a guardian ad
litem, who must obtain a first-hand understanding of the situation and needs of
a child. The guardian ad litem is required to present recommendations to the
court concerning the best interests of the child.3" Given what is known about
child development, these CAPTA requirements continue to be very beneficial
for children in child abuse and neglect proceedings.
A best interest standard takes into account that a child's capacity is one of
degree, and therefore strikes the best balance between providing a voice to the
child and ensuring the child's safety and welfare.3 2 An attorney who is also a
29 Jennifer Renne, Representing a Client with Diminished Capacity, 23 ABA CHILD LAW
PRAC. 1, 8 (2004).
30 Id.
31 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
32 Duquette, supra note 26, at 460.
'Competency, in this context, is a dimmer switch: the client can shed light on some aspects of the
representation, even though she cannot participate in all of it.' Professor Peter's metaphor of a
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guardian ad litem for a child often is in the best position to present an informed
picture of the child's life, needs, wishes, strengths and interests. The attorney/
guardian ad litem should collaborate with a multi-disciplinary team of profes-
sionals and conduct a thorough, individualized investigation into the child's life
before making any best interest determination. The ultimate determination of
the position that serves the child's best interest must strongly weigh the child's
wishes and desires. However, the child's preference must be examined in the
context of the child's age, degree of capacity, emotional functioning, and fam-
ily circumstances, as well as the particular situation.
Even in a best interest analysis, a child's preference can influence the
course of the litigation. As an example, "Jamie" is a six-year-old boy who
wants to return to his mother's care, despite spending the majority of his life in
a pre-adoptive home with foster parents with whom he is well bonded. Further-
more, he is well bonded to his siblings who live with maternal relatives and
whom he visits with on a weekly basis. The foster parents have a tenuous
relationship with the relatives and have cut off visits previously. The mother
only recently engaged in services and has had only occasional visits with
Jamie. His therapist recommends that he live with maternal relatives. How-
ever, a team of clinicians (social workers and a psychologist hired to do a best
interest analysis of whether to terminate parental rights) and the state child
welfare agency recommend termination of parental rights and adoption as the
best permanency plan.
Jamie may lack the capacity to direct the course of the litigation. But
while there may be strong best interest evidence for the attorney/guardian ad
litem to proceed with the termination of parental rights, it may not be in his best
interest. Jamie does not want to be adopted. It would be contrary to his best
interest to summarily disregard his preferences. The attorney/guardian ad litem
will have to work in concert with clinicians (and/or seek out further clinical
experts) to determine when, if ever, termination would be in his best interest.
As this example illustrates, the effective attorney/guardian ad litem cannot
exercise "relaxed advocacy."33 Although the child is under seven, the attorney/
guardian ad litem not only must seek out all relevant information to formulate a
position, but then must aggressively advocate for the child.
Critics of the attorney/guardian ad litem model argue that "best interests"
is too amorphous a standard, leaving overly broad discretion to the lawyer.
Advocates for the client-directed model fear that if children's lawyers are
allowed to advocate a best interests position, lawyers will substitute their unin-
formed, personal, and value-laden judgment about what is best for the children.
However, the best interests standard, when appropriately used, should never
equate with a lawyer's biased "substituted" judgment. Furthermore, the child-
'dimmer switch' is influential here in that the legislature recognized the fact that competence is
not an 'on or off' phenomenon where a child was either capable of directing the lawyer or not.
Rather, competence is a broader spectrum where children may be able to contribute various
amounts to guide the representation if the lawyer properly incorporates the child's unique
individuality.
Id. (internal citation omitted). See also Jean Koh Peters, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD
PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 53-54 (1997).
33 See Ventrell, supra note 23.
Spring 2006] 1291
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
directed model of representation itself leaves substantial room for lawyers to
substitute their judgments and exercise "unfettered discretion." As Donald
Duquette noted:
[T]hese so-called client-directed models actually contain within themselves serious
opportunities for lawyers to exercise unfettered and unreviewed discretion in repre-
senting children. This discretion is even more serious than that complained about
under the pure best interests approach because the latitude permitted in the client-
directed models is more private and less reviewable by a court and other litigants
than is the best interests discretion.
3 4
At this juncture all states and territories in the U.S. have adopted some
form of best interests standard for their courts to employ in making decisions
about custody, placement, and/or the termination of parental rights.35 How-
ever, states vary widely in the amount of guidance their statutes give when
defining best interests. Some statutes list extensive best interest factors relating
to the child-in-context that provide sufficient direction to prevent lawyers from
exercising unbridled discretion. These statutes also leave lawyers enough flexi-
bility to meet the unique needs of individual children.36
Surprisingly, as of 2003, fewer than twenty-five percent of state statutes
listed the child's wishes/desires as a factor to be considered in the best interest
analysis. Many of the statutes that listed this factor limited it to "reasonable
preferences" or preferences of children of a certain age or degree of maturity. 37
To help provide guidance and limit the degree of subjective discretion involved
in applying the best interests standard, national guidelines should clearly delin-
eate factors to consider in the best interest analysis. Those national guidelines
should include the child's preferences as a factor. At a minimum, practitioners
must be aware of the appropriate factors to be used when determining the best
interest of the child. Bright-line age limits should be avoided to ensure focus
on the uniqueness of the individual child.
Regardless of whether a client-directed model, guardian ad litem model, or
an attorney/guardian ad litem model of representation is utilized, an attorney
31 See Duquette, supra note 26, at 444.
11 See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN Svcs.: NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT INFO., STATE STATUTES SERIES: DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD (2005), http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/general/legal/statutes/best interest.pdf.
36 See for example, 705 111. Comp. Stat. § 405/1-3 (4.05) (West 2004), which provides:
Whenever a "best interest" determination is required, the following factors shall be considered in
the context of the child's age and developmental needs: (a) the physical safety and welfare of
the child, including food, shelter, health, and clothing; (b) the development of the child's iden-
tity; (c) the child's background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious; (d) the child's
sense of attachments, including: (i) where the child actually feels love, attachment, and a sense of
being valued (as opposed to where adults believe the child should feel such love, attachment, and
a sense of being valued); (ii) the child's sense of security; (iii) the child's sense of familiarity;
(iv) continuity of affection for the child; (v) the least disruptive placement alternative for the
child; (e) the child's wishes and long-term goals; (f) the child's community ties, including
church, school, and friends; (g) the child's need for permanence which includes the child's need
for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and with siblings and other rela-
tives; (h) the uniqueness of every family and child; (i) the risks attendant to entering and being in
substitute care; and (j) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child.
17 See state statutes described in U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN Svcs., 2003 CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATE STATUTES SERIES READY REFERENCE, PERMANENCY PLANNING:
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD (2003).
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should in all circumstances convey the child's wishes to the court.3 8 Children's
preferences deserve to be heard even when lawyers determine that the chil-
dren's wishes are not in their best interest, and therefore advocate for a differ-
ent, best-interest-based result.
As in Carmela's case, forming and consulting with a multidisciplinary
team, made up of child welfare professionals, interested adults and family
familiar with a child client, is critical to providing high quality ethical represen-
tation as an attorney/guardian ad litem. It is difficult for a single attorney to
master all of the fields (social work, psychology, medicine, education, etc.) that
serve children in child protection cases. Best practice should include a mul-
tidisciplinary team comprised of those fields. Whether the team is maintained
in house or relied upon outside of the attorney's office, this is a necessary part
of representation. Additionally, input and recommendations should be elicited
from experts providing services to the children and their families. An impor-
tant goal for an attorney/guardian ad litem is to be an educated consumer of
information obtained from other child welfare professionals. Central to best
practice standards is the duty of the attorney/guardian ad litem to play an active
role in convening and maintaining a multidisciplinary team.
Also, an effective and ethical attorney/guardian ad litem must have ade-
quate training, support and experience in representing children. An attorney/
guardian ad litem must seek out ongoing training or education in key areas,
such as child development, developmentally appropriate counseling techniques,
mental health, addictions and cultural competency. As in any field of law, the
lawyer must keep abreast of legal and ethical issues that affect the field. In the
developing child law field, there are organizations, such as the National Associ-
ation of Counsel for Children and the American Bar Association, that can pro-
vide support and assistance to the lawyer. And of course, the lawyer in an
attorney/guardian ad litem model must have an in-depth understanding of the
client. Attorneys must be aware of their child clients' life situations, level of
functioning and preferences in order to define their role as the children's
counsel.
A question that is often asked of the attorney/guardian ad litem model is:
when do clients have the right to make their own bad decisions? The answer
could be very complex, depending on the child's unique characteristics, and the
decision in question. However, in general, the role of the guardian ad litem
diminishes as children increase in their capacity to make decisions; the attorney
role predominates as children approach their majority (depending on each
child's unique situation). The guardian ad litem role may eventually become
unnecessary because the child fully attains the capacity to make decisions. As
an even more pragmatic matter, it is almost impossible to force teens or young
adults to do something that they do not want to do.
There are times when attorneys in this model must split their roles. This
splitting of roles most frequently occurs when children are in their middle
38 See Duquette, supra note 26, at 456-57 (quoting ADOPrION 2002: THE PRESIDENT'S INII-
ATIVE ON ADOPrION AND FOSTER CARE GUIDELINES FOR CHILDREN VII-21 (1999)) ("Even if
a child is not competent to direct the attorney and even if the role of the attorney is defined
as other than purely client directed ... , the wishes and preferences are always relevant and
should be communicated to the court unless limited by privilege").
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years, eight to twelve, and are taking a position, after extensive counseling by
their attorney/guardian ad litem, that is contrary to their best interest and that
could place them at substantial risk of harm. When advocating, the attorney
must clearly state their child clients' wishes and reasoning, as well as point out
the clients' strengths. As guardian ad litem, a lawyer must present the rea-
son(s) that a child's position may not be in the child's best interest. The focus
in the representation is to obtain as much relevant information as possible, then
present the information to the court and advocate for the child.
Although the roles may need to be split in the attorney/guardian ad litem
model, this does not mean that there is an inherent conflict in the roles. The
Illinois Appellate Court recently addressed the issue of whether a per se con-
flict exists when an attorney acts as both defense counsel and guardian ad
litem.39 The court concluded that a per se conflict does not exist merely
because an attorney also acts as guardian ad litem on the same case. The court
concluded that it was both "financially and functionally prudent" to appoint a
single attorney to serve in both capacities.4 ° This conclusion was based on the
court's opinion that, in many cases, no significant conflict exists.
Conflicts between the attorney and guardian ad litem roles do arise, and
the role conflict may in rare cases become unmanageable. As the ABA and
NACC standards recognize, attorneys can and should counsel their clients to
seek a better course of action.4 ' Counseling a client regarding a better course
of action often works to help the client make good decisions. This is especially
effective when the attorney and client have established a good relationship.
Sometimes the child client's wishes may be contrary to the law, or impossible
to satisfy in view of the facts in a case, and the attorney is prohibited from
bringing a frivolous claim.42 For example, a child may be seeking return to a
parent who is unwilling to accept the child back into the home. If the client
persists in this position after counseling by the attorney, the attorney still can-
not seek an order for that placement. There is no good-faith-based factual argu-
ment for the position. The attorney/guardian ad litem would instead seek
appropriate family reunification services.
If the role conflict is not resolved, attorneys may have to seek to withdraw
from one or both of their roles and have another lawyer appointed, or the child
may seek to discharge the attorney. Additionally, as in any other attorney/
client relationship, there may be a breakdown in the relationship between the
child client and the attorney/guardian ad litem. But the court and the parties
must be informed of the child's position regardless of the attorney/guardian ad
litem's position, because in every model, the child's wishes are a crucial factor
in the best interest determination.
39 In re B.K., 833 N.E.2d 945 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005);*see also In re J.D. 815 N.E.2d 13 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2004) (holding that there was no conflict where an attorney appointed to represent a
2-year-old child in child protection proceedings was also appointed to represent the child's
non-attorney guardian ad litem).
40 In re B.K., 833 N.E.2d at 952.
41 ABA, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND
NEGLECT CASES, § B-4(3) & cmt. (1996); NACC, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS
WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES §§ B-4 and B-4(4) (1999).
42 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1, 3.3 (2002).
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V. CONCLUSION
Representing children in child protection cases presents numerous chal-
lenges. The representation may occur over a period of years crossing a number
of developmental stages. Representing children presents different challenges
and constraints than representing adults. The different legal and psychological
standard for representing children is based upon the limitations in their cogni-
tive capacity, and society's duty to recognize children's limitations. It is not
for the faint-hearted, and the lawyer representing a child must be prepared to
tackle difficult and complex issues. The dilemmas presented by representing
children while maintaining appropriate legal ethics must be resolved within fis-
cal reality. It is difficult to financially justify the appointment of two people to
represent one child because of a vague potential for a conflict of interest, and
such appointments are not necessary. It is clear that children in child protection
proceedings have a right to counsel. Their limited capacity and the need to
present best interest evidence require the appointment of a guardian ad litem as
well. A sophisticated attorney/guardian ad litem model has the flexibility to
effectively address both children's rights and their needs.
